Pourquoi, lorsqu’il s’agit de mener des démarches de lobbying auprès des institutions européennes, les entreprises et les groupes d’intérêts utilisent-ils les services aussi bien de fédérations professionnelles, de lobbyistes établis au sein même de leur structure que de consultants extérieurs (une même organisation pouvant solliciter ces différents intervenants simultanément, alternativement, voire en les opposant les uns aux autres) ? Y a-t-il là un élément signicatif de la nature de l’influence exercée par les lobbyistes sur le système de décision européen ? Ces questions sont posées dans un récent ouvrage (en anglais) d’Irina Michalowitz, professeur-assistant à l’Institut d’études avancées de Vienne – ouvrage dont la conclusion ne manquera pas de faire débat à Bruxelles : l’influence du lobbying mené au niveau européen pourrait s’avérer beaucoup plus limitée qu’on ne le pense.
Based on original data from 106 interviews with Brussels lobbyists, their clients and with decision-makers, and an online survey in the field of information technology and transport, Michalowitz points out two particularly striking points:
1) There is a functional division of labour between lobbyists.
This division of labour is well known to their clients, and they use them accordingly. The way lobbyists are used simultaneously, opposing or alternatively may at times appear irrational, but actually constitutes a strategy. Four main purposes of agent-use can be detected:
• Contact provision
• Information provision
• Support function
• Back-up/direct lobbying
Along these four functions, two groups of lobbying agents can be distinguished. The first of these are those with a pure mediator- or advisory role – such as political consultants and, to some extent, regional offices. The second group consists of those that are, although carrying out functions for members or employers, are at the same time accepted as actors in their own right because they identify themselves with the interest they represent: In-house lobbyists and Euro groups. Clients use agents according to their strengths, and especially, they use agents simultaneously in order for them to cross-control each other. The purpose is to ensure the greatest possible effort in the client’s interest, and to gain sufficient information in order to switch agents in time when unsuccessful.
2) The strategy used for lobbying has no traceable influence on the lobbying success.
The analysis of lobbying strategies in six cases related to the telecommunications package and to different legislative acts on maritime safety revealed that the quality of a lobbying strategy and the ability to influence the outcome of a legislative act may be un- or only weakly related.
In the six cases, the influence of lobbying of particular private actors via their agents was measured. In order to assess influence, the initial aims of the lobbying targets (i.e. decision-makers) was firstly examined and compared with the interests of the analysed private actors. Secondly, other lobbying activities or impacts relevant in the case were analysed. Thirdly, the interrelations between lobbying actors, agents and lobbying targets were assessed, as was the connection of these interrelations to position shifts or non-shifts of the lobbying targets. Finally, the outcome satisfaction of the analysed lobbying actors was assessed and connected to the lobbying activities of these actors, as well as to those of other actors or agents involved in the case.
Only one factor proved to be particularly decisive in the analysed cases: the political will of governmental actors. Lobbying strategies could only be called successful when the initial political will was either in line with the lobbying interests, or when the decision-makers were indifferent to the outcome of legislation. Whenever an opposing political will had already developed in either one of the analysed European institutions, lobbying strategies were unsuccessful.
Hence, the final degree of influence lobbyists can exert may only be secondarily determined by these behavioural patterns. At least in the examined cases, the presence of a political will predominantly determined the outcome of a policy decision: EU lobbying influence may only reach as far as the political elite wants it to.
To read the DIPA Paper by the author (in German) click
here
.
To find our more about the book and the book presentation (in English) organised by the German Institute for Public Affairs (DIPA) and EURACTIV in Brussels on Tuesday, 21 June 2005 at 5.30 pm (International Press Centre, 1 Bd. Charlemagne) go to the DIPA website.