Alors que la communauté internationale se prépare en vue des futures discussions sur le statut final du Kosovo, une série de dossiers sensibles doivent encore faire l’objet d’un examen attentif, affirme le médiateur en poste dans la région. Cet article a été rédigé par Marek Antoni Nowicki pour le compte de Transitions Online.
Nobody knows what lies in store for Kosovo as the international community, local leaders, and ordinary citizens prepare for the talks on Kosovo’s status that are likely to unfold over this and next year.
On the one hand, Kosovo Albanians yearn for independent statehood, and many seem to be under the impression that such a wish could be granted rather soon. What they fail to understand is that independence would not immediately, or necessarily, usher in an era of prosperity and freedom.
On the other hand, most Kosovo Serbs reject the idea of independence outright. They see independence as legitimating the “ethnic cleansing” of the province and as validating the project to create a Greater Albania. Independence would mean that there would no longer be a place for them in a land that they regard, historically and mythically, as the cradle of Serbian cultural and spiritual identity.
If Kosovo is indeed accorded some sort of independence, the Kosovo Serbs, who have long thought of themselves as part of a larger entity (that of Serbia), will for the first time really become a minority community in a new political landscape with which they would find it difficult to identify. For all the consequences this implies, are they mentally prepared for such a likely reality–a reality dominated by a tightly knit network of big Kosovo Albanian families that run the region in a somewhat exclusive, clan-like fashion?
Poverty and anger
Let’s take an honest, hard look at Kosovo today: Poverty is widespread, and a considerable number of people endure difficult, even harsh, daily living conditions. There is a significant gap between those who are receiving meager social welfare assistance and those who are not, not to mention massive unemployment and a fast-growing youth population with few meaningful prospects.
I hear a great deal of discussion about how such dire living conditions breed a growing sense of frustration and anger among the population. But one must remember that this frustration is not unique to one ethnic group in Kosovo. Everyone is suffering under the current circumstances, albeit in a different manner. But the people who tend to suffer first are the most vulnerable populations–usually, but not only, the minority communities. And in Kosovo, even Serbs do not occupy the lowest rung of the ladder.
The Kosovo Serbs are better off than other non-Albanians in the province because they receive significant support from the Serbian government. Without that support, it is doubtful the Serb community could have survived the past five years.
But assistance, financial and otherwise, also reinforces a sense of loyalty and dependence towards Serbia. An independent Kosovo would mean being cut off from such support and living with the consequences. Would the Kosovo budget be able to assume this additional cost, to assist an unloved minority?
Apart from these daily social, political, and material factors, there are other elements that make people irritated and non-cooperative. During a recent conversation, the speaker of the Kosovo Assembly, Nexhat Daci, asked, how can a frustrated majority take care of its minorities? Such statements are key to understanding what’s going on in Kosovo.
To read the article in full, visit the Transitions Online website.
