Afin de mesurer la nature et l’étendue des intérêts américains dans les pays d’Europe centrale et orientale (PECO), il faut se envisager à la fois la perspective américaine et les choix stratégiques des PECO. Dans ce contexte, l’évolution de l’UE et le rôle de la Fédération russe sont devenues des variables importantes dans cette équation transatlantique, écrit Janus Bugajski dans The Analyst, un nouveau trimestriel qui traite des questions politiques et du développement économique et social des PECO.
American and Central European interests
The U.S. administration has been strongly supportive of the CEE states and their international aspirations, for several reasons. The military protection of Western Europe and the political liberation of Communist Europe were important legacies of the Cold War and of America’s investment in European security. The successful construction of democratic polities and market systems was seen as a major achievement of U.S. foreign policy through decades of intensive diplomatic engagement and material investment in Europe.
In Washington’s estimation, the CEE countries have also become valuable role models for political and economic transition whose experiences could be applied to other post-dictatorial systems. With the renewed commitment of the George W. Bush administration to combating Islamicist terrorists and promoting democracy in other regions, CEE states were held up as pertinent examples of success, not only for less successful countries in their neighborhood, but also for the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Moreover, most of the new CEE democracies sided with Washington over the Iraqi intervention despite the opposition of several West European capitals, thus helping to boost their prestige in the U.S.
CEE views of the United States have been shaped primarily by the Cold War and its aftermath. America was recognized throughout the region as the major bulwark against communism and Soviet expansionism, and as the beacon of freedom, democracy, and national independence. Washington was perceived as instrumental in the collapse of communist rule and the unraveling of the Soviet bloc. The U.S. has also been viewed as providing critical political, economic, and security support during the process of democratization and in ensuring that most of the CEE states were integrated into the NATO alliance.
In CEE capitals, America is recognized as the leader of the “democratic community” that has invested significantly in the region’s transformation and remains essential for ensuring security throughout Europe. It is also acknowledged as the key power in moving the boundaries of NATO and even the EU further eastward. The EU as an institution, and its West European founder states, are not considered to have sufficient military power, international prestige, or political will to ensure further Western enlargement. As a result, each CEE government has sought to develop a “special relationship or “strategic partnership” with the U.S. and to maintain a close bond in an uncertain international environment.
The U.S. is also considered by CEE capitals to have a more realistic, clear-cut, and consistent policy toward Russia than the EU. It is the primary Western power that Moscow purportedly respects, and CEE leaders calculate that a close alliance with America will help protect these new democracies against present and future Russian pressures. In particular, Washington’s presence is considered vital in Poland and the three Baltic countries, as Vladimir Putin’s Russia has become more regionally assertive with the goal of creating a neighborhood of client states. By contrast, EU policy is perceived among CEE officials as inconsistent and inadequate, and the Union as a whole is not fully respected by the Kremlin as a major global power. Moreover, Moscow has been able to exploit its bilateral relations with countries such as France and Germany to try and divide the Union, sideline the CEE capitals, and undermine the trans-Atlantic link.
The transatlantic context
CEE relations with the U.S. need to be assessed in a broader context, where trans-Atlantic links have weakened in recent years. There are several reasons for this deterioration. First, the end of bipolarity was precipitated by the disappearance of a clear Soviet enemy threatening European security, something which cemented the NATO alliance. Second, the evolving European entity is more than just an economic project. It is also one that had political and security aspirations, which that have expanded in recent years. Third, EU developments raised the ambitions of some West European capitals, which saw the opportunity at the end of the Cold War to reduce the American presence and influence in Europe and to create a more Euro-Centric structure. Fourth, there was an evident American reluctance to use NATO as the military organization of first resort when U.S. national interests were directly challenged, especially in the wake of the terrorist attacks on 9/11.
And fifth, any power that becomes as dominant and predominant as the U.S. invariably breeds resentment and opposition, even among traditional allies. A fusion of resentments has been visible against American military predominance, economic omnipresence, and mass cultural influence. Many Europeans now also equate globalization with Americanization and this has accentuated fears of economic dominance and cultural imperialism.
A litany of U.S. policy decisions added fuel to these flames during the Bush presidency. These included disputes over the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and National Missile Defense (NMD), and America’s reluctance to participate in the global land-mines ban, the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the Kyoto protocols on global warming.
Some Euro-nationalist politicians foresee an evolving EU that will more effectively compete with the U.S. on the global stage. Their postures have contributed to disputes, as some CEE and West European capitals are unwilling to build European identity around opposition to American policy. Hence, resistance to military action in Iraq in 2003 was not viewed in most CEE countries as being motivated primarily by moral or legal standpoints, but by a mixture of pacifist convenience and a cynical intent to widen the trans-Atlantic rift.
During President Bush’s first term, relations between the U.S. and many of the EU member states deteriorated and the role of NATO, which keeps America closely engaged in Europe, came under severe strain. Disputes over numerous issues, ranging from the legitimacy of the ICC to the war in Iraq, created deep rifts in the Alliance. Among the most controversial issues were the lingering questions of American-European burden sharing, Europe’s emerging defense pillar, NATO’s new missions, and the U.S.-led anti-terrorist and anti-“rogue state” campaign. The CEE governments became seriously concerned that after the attacks on America, the U.S. war against international terrorists would sideline both Europe and NATO as America’s strategic priorities, thus having a negative impact on the security of the CEE countries.
U.S. policy makers drew some specific lessons from the 1999 NATO military campaign over Kosovo, during which the inadequacies of European defense capabilities were glaringly exposed. Pressing questions about burden sharing and power sharing in the U.S.-European relationship continue to be raised, and Washington is critical about the inadequacies of EU defense spending in the age of global terrorism and regional instabilities.
While America is accused by some EU states of being a unilateralist bully, Europe is often accused of dependence, complacency, and most recently of obstruction. Some U.S. officials have concluded that, due to the EU’s unwillingness or incapability to contribute militarily, as well as its frequent criticisms of American policy, NATO may become increasingly irrelevant to future security challenges. Thus, America will have little alternative but to act alone or with a coalition of dependable partners, whether in Europe or outside, when combat action is considered necessary.
The onset of the second Bush presidency in early 2005 precipitated a period of rebuilding U.S.-EU relations. Washington appeared to step back from a unilateralist approach in dealing with emerging international challenges. U.S. officials sought to revive their relations with several West European states. President Bush’s European trip in February 2005, at the start of his second term in office, was an important gesture of reconciliation after several years of tension. Meetings in both the NATO and EU formats at summits in Brussels indicated that Washington placed high value on both institutions and viewed Europe as an important partner.
The relationship between the U.S. and the EU will remain asymmetrical. Washington possesses global interests and unmatched military power. However, in many instances the U.S. needs the EU as a diplomatic and economic player, a generator of stability within an expanding Europe, and a supplementary security contributor outside the European zone. Hence, the second Bush administration has focused on rebuilding a partnership with the EU in dealing with the threat of nuclear proliferation in Iran, the advancement of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and in upholding the embargo on sensitive military exports to China.
Nevertheless, it remained unclear whether the rifts visible during the first Bush term were merely temporary disputes and whether moves toward reconciliation are short-term efforts in a steadily declining relationship. A statement by German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder on the eve of the Bush trip to Europe in February 2005 seemed to undermine the notion that NATO was the primary platform of trans-Atlantic dialogue. Schroeder’s idea that the EU should play the principal partnership role with the U.S. elicited only limited backing among delegates at an annual security conference in Munich. However, the notion received an endorsement from French President Jacques Chirac, thus reviving the specter of a Franco-German security axis. Nonetheless, any sustained attempt to base the European project on the principle of unified opposition to the U.S. is unlikely to be successful given the disparate interests within the EU. It may primarily serve to divide the EU itself.
Central European bridges
In this wider trans-Atlantic context, where the U.S.-EU relationship has been marked by disputes and conflicts, the CEE countries aimed to uphold a viable U.S.-European partnership by maintaining the American presence in Europe and raising U.S. interests in CEE developments. An important reason for active CEE involvement in America’s post 9/11 military missions has been to display political solidarity with Washington as an insurance policy for their own future security. The new democracies avoided adopting positions contrary to that of the White House and were determined to be considered as reliable long-term allies.
However, an underlying concern for U.S. policy-makers must be that the national memories of American assistance in helping to eradicate communism and build democratic systems are gradually receding in the CEE region. Future relations are more likely to be based on starker pragmatic choices and state interests, rather than on historical links and national sentiments. Moral debts to the U.S. are likely to lose out to practical requirements, such as gaining EU funding and maintaining good relations with the larger and richer West European neighbors, especially if major conventional security threats continue to recede.
Although the CEE countries are not economically or militarily powerful, many have made it a national priority to contribute to NATO and U.S. missions, in order to demonstrate that they have graduated from consumers to producers of security. In addition to participation in NATO missions in Bosnia-Hercegovina (1995-2004) and Kosovo (1999-present), and the Italian-led Operation Alba in Albania after the 1997 crisis, several CEE states made contributions to the U.S.-led coalition missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. By the fall of 2003, the CEE states made up approximately half of the non-American peace-keeping troops in Iraq. Several new allies have also developed niche capabilities that are valuable for Washington, including expertise in de-mining and chemical, bacteriological, and radiological decontamination.
However, despite their contributions to recent U.S.-led missions, the CEE capitals remain hamstrung by limited and costly military capabilities. The annual defense budget of the new NATO members totals less than $10 billion and their restricted manpower only permits small military contributions. As a result of both financial and political factors, several CEE states planned to withdraw their forces from Iraq by the close of 2005. For instance, officials in Poland admitted that the country’s ambitions were bigger than its material base and it would be incapable of participating in the Iraqi mission without U.S. assistance. Warsaw and other capitals wanted to avoid the creation of a two-tiered military with a small, modernized, and mobile elite force and a larger conventional outfit that lacked resources for restructuring.
From a White House perspective, many of the CEE capitals delivered when it was most needed in Afghanistan and Iraq. It was not simply a question of troop numbers, which remained restricted, but of political commitment based on shared principles and common goals. The Bush administration could thereby underscore that it was not alone in its pre-emptive missions, despite the reluctance of several major NATO members to participate.
America’s new allies also gained direct benefits from engaging in international military operations, including a faster track to NATO entry, American security guarantees, closer military-to-military contacts, the enhancement of U.S. business investment, and the likelihood of gaining American military bases in the coming years. But with little indication of stability and security in Iraq, with casualties mounting among coalition members, and with terrorist threats directed against the territories of several CEE countries, the durability of ad-hoc military coalitions has been seriously tested. In terms of potential security threats, the CEE states continue to trust Washington as a security provider more than any European capital or the EU as a whole. This was the main reason why they all petitioned for NATO membership with its article five guarantee. A more assertive Kremlin has also reinforced the stance of countries which border Russia, or which express fears about possible threats emanating from neighbors to the east.
Several CEE states have welcomed the prospect of U.S. military bases on their territories. After years of negotiation and review, by the close of 2005, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria were poised to host American troops and logistics in compact staging points. According to credible reports, a self-contained and rotational Brigade Command Team (BCT) would deploy in and out of various CEE locations. CEE will also receive some command and control components, training facilities, pre-positioned stocks of heavy equipment, and power projection infrastructure. This would provide the U.S. with greater military capability and strategic flexibility while enabling a more rapid deployment of U.S. forces and equipment to crisis points in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. It is hoped that the infusion of the U.S. military and the prospect of civic works and infrastructure projects near base locations will reinforce pro-American connections in these countries.
A troubling question that confronts all new allies is whether the American security connection is genuinely based on long-term interests or has become contingent on tactical opportunities and conditioned on short-term objectives. Policy analysts need to ascertain whether the U.S. and CEE can become long-range strategic allies and not just short-term instrumental partners. To answer these questions, the policies of current CEE governments need to be weighed against the postures of major opposition parties, trends in public opinion, and the impact of EU membership.
Two developments in particular must be carefully monitored: the staunchly pro-EU position of the mainstream CEE center-left parties and growing Euro-skepticism, anti-federalism, and even traditional nationalism among CEE center-right formations. Center-left parties may increasingly adopt the Euro-focused positions of their West European counterparts, while center-right neo-liberal formations may take aboard more Euroskeptic positions but without a strong countervailing Atlanticism. Both tendencies could serve to weaken the pro-American stance of the new allies in CEE. Such political trends are compounded by concerns among CEE leaders that their countries have not received sufficient reciprocal benefits from the U.S. for their willingness to participate in military coalitions despite the staunch opposition of several EU partners, and for not succumbing to terrorist pressure and domestic public opinion against military action. For example, CEE officials complain about America’s strict visa regime for their citizens and have been disappointed about the level of U.S. business investment, the limited contracts offered in Iraq’s material reconstruction, and by Washington’s pressures for the CEE countries to write off the substantial financial debts owed to them by Baghdad. A growing number of citizens and politicians in the region complain that the Bush administration has simply used the CEE states instrumentally as a political cover and Washington will forget their sacrifices when it becomes convenient. Cynicism and even resentment has permeated the public debate throughout the region.
Economic trends between the U.S. and the CEE are also troubling from the perspective of building a strong and durable alliance. By the early 2000s, the New Allies conducted between half and three quarters of their trade with the EU countries and less than 5% of their trade was with the U.S. Moreover, American business investment has been limited. Among the countries that account for the largest share, Hungary has recorded about 25% of its total foreign direct investment from the U.S., Poland 15%, and the Czech Republic 6%. Moreover, the figures remain low in comparison to U.S. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Western Europe and other regions of the world. Indeed, in the period 2003-2004, of the total amount invested by U.S. companies in Europe as a whole, less than 10% reached the CEE economies.
Support among the CEE countries for Washington’s military missions in the Middle East and elsewhere remains shallow. Even though most governments have backed the American position, they closely track the public mood and the stance and impact of the political opposition. If public opinion were to be transformed into political action, then support for future U.S.-led missions that are not approved by the UN Security Council or by NATO acting in unison seem less likely in the region.
The security and foreign policy approaches of CEE countries will also need to be more closely synchronized with the Union if, indeed, Brussels develops a coherent and unified policy. Moreover, the military capabilities of all CEE capitals remains restricted and overstretched amidst budgetary cutbacks and the growing primacy of social and economic priorities. In this context, the durability and dependability of the CEE capitals in their practical support for Washington cannot be guaranteed. Indications or perceptions that the U.S. will take CEE support on controversial foreign policy issues for granted may in itself become a political factor emboldening anti-American, pro-EU, or neutral positions in the years ahead.
Eastern dimensions
The new EU members assert that the Union has no common or effective foreign policy toward Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, or Russia. Such disunity can be manipulated by Moscow to its advantage. Germany, France and Italy, in particular, seek to maintain strong bilateral ties with Russia and not jeopardize these relations for what are perceived as subsidiary regional issues. Several CEE capitals complain that the EU as a whole has even failed to condemn persistent Russian pressure against the three Baltic states, despite the fact that they are now part of the Union. While Moscow refuses to accept them as fully sovereign states, several EU members act as if they were unimportant peripheries.
Russian officials are intent on deflating NATO and EU capabilities in their neighborhood. They were buoyed by the failure to pass the EU’s Constitutional Treaty in France and Holland in mid-2005. They claimed that the Union’s enlargement strategy was the cause of the problem, because Brussels overestimated its absorption capacity with the accession of eight CEE countries.
Moscow felt uneasy about the EU’s eastward expansion for several reasons: it was excluded from the process of a united Europe, it brought into the Union allegedly Russophobic states, and it encouraged Russia’s « near abroad » to canvass for EU membership. Kremlin officials are likely to use the constitutional failure to encourage a halt to further enlargement eastwards, and to demand the EU’s acknowledgement of Russia’s primary responsibility in the non-EU Eastern European region.
The states that emerged from the Soviet Union are a source of strategic competition between Russia and Central Europe. This contest has sharpened significantly since ten CEE states became members of NATO and eight of these joined the EU in 2004. Most of the CEE capitals have endeavored to pull their immediate neighbors into the Euro-Atlantic institutions, while Russia has sought to construct a countervailing political, economic and security structure.
For Warsaw and Moscow in particular, the historic struggle for influence over the lands between the Polish and Russian borders has accelerated. Poland seeks to increase its leverage within the EU and NATO and its close relations with the U.S. to pull Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova into the Western orbit. Russia is intent on maintaining primary influence over these countries, especially over their foreign policies and security orientations, and to prevent their merger into Western organizations.
Given these realities, Washington finds itself caught in a difficult position between three competing interests: a core of new Allies in CEE that seek American support for their foreign policy priorities; a protective axis of older EU members who are apprehensive about a new Cold War with Moscow; and a Russia that is supportive of U.S. anti-terrorist policy but which is heading in an authoritarian direction and adopting imperialist policies toward its former satellites. Balancing these distinct interests is a challenge for the Bush administration especially, as it has prioritized the promotion of freedom and democracy as a distinct national interest. If it is rigorously pursued, such a policy could place the White House in direct confrontation with the Kremlin.
Prospects for U.S. policy
American interests in the CEE region have become an important component of Washington’s relations with the European Union. The EU remains a work in progress, and its final shape and structure cannot be easily predicted. Its immediate future is contingent upon the political aftermath of the failure to publicly approve and ratify the EU Constitutional Treaty.
Some analysts have speculated that rejection of the Treaty will turn the Union inward, forestall any further enlargement, and prevent the emergence of an effective EU security and foreign policy. Whether such a scenario would weaken or strengthen trans-Atlantic relations is a matter of conjecture. While some American policy makers would prefer to deal with a more fractured EU and focus on stronger bilateral relations with individual EU capitals, others believe that this would make each member state less effective in supporting or complementing U.S. policy, and more prone to disputes with their European partners.
For the EU newcomers, the Union has grown in importance in virtually every domain – in trade, foreign direct investment, social contacts, and cultural and educational interchanges. While such a process of integration seems unavoidable, it can also seriously erode trans-Atlantic relations if it develops at the expense of CEE-U.S. ties.
There is a prevailing sense in much of CEE that the U.S. is steadily withdrawing from the region, whether politically or economically, and views Europe as a secondary concern or through the prism of selected EU members. America’s diplomatic and business presence is increasingly viewed as shallow and shrinking in comparison to the West Europeans. A significant amount of political investment needs to be devoted by Washington in order to steadily develop its new alliances while remodeling its relations with the EU as a whole.
In recent years, U.S. policy analysts have focused on America’s deteriorating ties with the traditional EU powers, especially France and Germany. However, policy makers have not sufficiently explored scenarios for the EU’s evolution following its enlargement eastward. It is insufficient to merely highlight the foreign policy dilemmas of the CEE states in seeking to balance their relations with the EU and the U.S.
Many commentators emphasize what is now common knowledge – that these countries do not wish to make stark choices between the U.S. and the EU, but are pursuing trans-Atlantic complementarity in security questions. Such analyses lack a longer-term perspective on the political orientations and public trends visible in specific CEE states, their distinctive foreign policy priorities, and their developing bilateral relations with Washington and the major EU capitals.
While the EU is struggling to find its identity and global role, the NATO alliance is also experiencing a prolonged period of flux, seeking to find its own identity and mission in a post-Cold War world. Clearly, the anti-terrorist campaign, or any other contemporary international crisis, does not have the same trans-Atlantic adhesive force as the struggle against communism and Soviet expansion once did. Different NATO members exhibit contrasting national priorities and a variable willingness to contribute to NATO missions. Moreover, some West European capitals are placing more focus on the EU’s emerging security policy, and even de-emphasizing their commitments to NATO. These trends have important implications for America’s newest allies.
It is in America’s interest to ensure that it has dependable and predictable partners within the EU, and sufficient areas of commonality with CEE to avoid strategic divergence on essential security issues. Such an outcome would help forestall the EU from developing into a potentially hostile bloc that may seek to oppose or neutralize U.S. policies on numerous foreign policy questions. American policymakers must gauge political developments in each country, as these will have an important impact on the reliability of both old and new allies.
U.S. security interests would benefit from having a coherent and united European ally that can cooperate and complement the projection of America’s political authority, economic strength, and military power. Conversely, a more Atlanticist EU may encourage a more multilateralist U.S. policy, at least on issues of primary concern to both sides of the Atlantic. In the optimum scenario, CEE inclusion in the EU will buttress the Union’s security capabilities and reinforce the trans-Atlantic connection. In an alternative favorable scenario for Washington, the EU will prove unable to develop a coherent foreign policy that could challenge American interests, while the majority of key European states will continue to maintain close ties with the U.S. whether through NATO or at a bilateral level. Regardless of the degree of European unity, the significance of any new ally would then be measured by its contribution to trans-Atlantic relations.
A third scenario, favored by some U.S. policy analysts, is to try and actively “disaggregate” the EU through a modern-day version of “divide and rule.” This would involve dealing selectively with European partners, favoring some states over others, promoting political disputes between the European allies, rewarding the most loyal capitals, and undercutting any emerging common EU foreign and security policy. Such an approach assumes that Washington intensifies its unilateralist approach. But there are dangers involved in such a policy, as it could increase Euro-Gaullist trends in the EU, limit the number and effectiveness of America’s partners, and severely weaken an institution that could complement American strategy in various parts of the globe.
A fuller comprehension of the motives, objectives, and capabilities of America’s CEE allies will be essential for devising a durable American strategy toward each country, the wider region, and the EU as an institution. Significant questions remain for the U.S. administration in the ongoing global campaign against unconventional insecurities, including the durability of America’s current coalition with the CEE states. Policy makers in Washington need to comprehensively reassess the strength and purpose of the Atlantic Alliance in the context of both EU and NATO evolution. An enhanced understanding of Washington’s support base in CEE will help ascertain the impact European enlargement will have on trans-Atlantic relations. Such an assessment can help provide a more solid foundation for the development of effective and long-range U.S. policy that can enhance both American and Allied security.
If it values a strong trans-Atlantic link, the Bush administration will need to reinforce ties with its new CEE allies, as well as with more traditional partners. Political support for CEE priority issues, whether towards Russia, the CIS, the Black Sea region, or the Western Balkans, together with appropriate economic and business benefits, may help guarantee more durable commitments to the trans-Atlantic relationship. Simultaneously, the challenge for the new allies is not a question of simply balancing U.S. and EU interests, but of making these interests compatible, complementary, implementable, effective and durable. And the challenge for Washington is to transform the EU into a partner that complements America’s strategic goals and does not obstruct or divert them.
The White House can reinvigorate America’s approach through more effective and “active relations” based on concrete political and economic commitments.
For instance, Washington can more resolutely support Central Europe’s inclusionist Eastern Dimension and help implement lasting solutions to the “frozen conflicts” in Moldova and Georgia. U.S. military basing in CEE could be tied to the development of major infrastructural projects that can benefit wider sectors of the population. The anti-terrorist pact could involve a host of U.S. assistance programs such as civil emergency training, technical modernization for border guards, and the development of intelligence capabilities. U.S. defense companies that have shown a renewed interest in the CEE’s military sector as the modernization process intensifies should be encouraged to invest.
Above all, a regular consultative process between Washington and the CEE states can be developed, in which all sides can pinpoint their priorities and decide on the possibilities for coordinated actions.
Such measures can help promote Washington’s newest European partners as long-term allies who will calculate that it is in their national interests to maintain a close relationship with the U.S. At the same time, the U.S. administration will need to understand that it is in America’s national interest to ensure sufficient strategic and economic benefits for the CEE states in order to guarantee their commitment to the trans-Atlantic relationship.
It is incumbent on the CEE capitals to define appropriate programs for developing bilateral links with the U.S. At the same time, public expectations of material benefits should not be raised too high, as they were before the Iraqi war or in the midst of negotiations over the emplacement of American military units. Equally necessary is a U.S. strategic vision toward CEE and the EU as a whole, which will outlast any particular administration and outlive any specific policy.
In sum, Washington needs to ensure that it will have a majority of dependable partners within the enlarging EU, in order to avoid damaging divergence on essential security questions. Such a constructive strategy will require commitment and determination on both sides of the Atlantic, in which Europe’s new democracies will play an instrumental role.
The article was published in The Analyst
, a new quarterly focussed on the key political, economic and social developments in Central Eastern Europe.
Janusz Bugajski is Director of the New European Democracies project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C. He is the co-author with Ilona Teleki of the forthcoming book “Atlantic Bridges: America’s New European Allies.”