Guillaume Durand (European Policy Centre) examine l’approche de la Commission concernant les fusions controversées dans les secteurs du gaz et de l’électricité et tire des conclusions pour la future politique énergétique commune de l’UE.
Looking at the E.On/Endesa and Suez/Gaz de France (GDF) mergers, the author regrets that « it is the single market and competition rules which have come to the fore » in the debate, despite energy cutting across a wide range of other policies.
On this issue, he dismisses the « black and white » argument according to which « national mergers » along the Suez/GDF pattern are « political deals » which are « intrinsically bad and contrary to the spirit of the ongoing liberalisation process in Europe, » whereas « purely ‘market-based’ transnational deals are widely held up as essentially positive contribution to a well-functioning pan-European market. »
This vision is too simplistic because there is no such thing as an absolutely politically neutral energy deal, according to the author, who says merger decisions should not only be assessed by their market relevance. As far as the EU state of play is concerned, G. Durand blames it on the Commission for looking at electricity and gas « mainly through internal market lenses, » and for favouring liberalisation over regulation and cooperation between national systems. By so doing, the European executive has in fact missed its initial target (of achieving competitive energy tariffs), thus producing more « cartelisation » instead of more integration of European gas and electricity markets. This drift is being reinforced by the Commission’s weaknesses as a « regulator of the [national] regulators. » Therefore, »markets are, at best, regional and few are truly competitive, » the author concludes.
Reacting to this situation by getting tougher on competition issues – as the Commission has done since it launched an energy sector competition inquiry in June 2005 – by no means is a solution, G. Durand argues. First, because the Commission’s competition powers are limited, and second, because what is needed now is putting an end to « increasing misgivings about what market liberalisation can achieve within the current framework. » As long as European energy markets remain geographically fragmented and poorly regulated at EU level, there is no incentive for operators to invest in infrastructure and to manage supply on a longer-run perspective (which would cut prices), the analyst says.
For the EU to turn words on a common energy policy into deeds, the author recommends the Commission:
- To trigger a debate on the ‘European interest’ in the energy field, thus better « defining and delivering the relevant public goods » such as « energy security, a well-functioning pan-European network, and a set of genuinely common rules. »
- To integrate into the EU energy strategy « potentially-conflicting » but related objectives such as « competitiveness, security of supply, environmental protection and nuclear safety. »
G. Durand hopes this would help Member States becoming more confident and finally more « enthusiast » for deeper integration of the European energy sector – a sector that is historically constitutive of the EU edifice.