La crainte que le marché européen de l’emploi
puisse être inondé par des flots de travailleurs turcs
pèse fortement sur le débat autour de la candidature de
la Turquie, écrivent Refik
Erzan, Umut Kuzubas
et Nilufer Yildiz dans une note publiée par
le Centre for European Policy Studies.
This fear has been so strong that permanent derogations from the
principle of free movement have been proposed by some, although
they are clearly not compatible with the Treaty.
Unfortunately, the debate about the implications of extending
the principle of free movement of workers (one the core four
freedoms) to Turkey seems often to miss the point. Those who argue
against membership or at least for permanent safeguards seem to
ignore reality, which is that already today, with all the existing
restrictions on labour migration, there is a significant migration
flow from Turkey to the EU (principally Germany) amounting to some
70,000 persons per year. If the present situation persists, one
could thus expect an influx of a total of almost 1.5 million
Turkish immigrants over the next 20 years – even without the
prospect of EU membership for Turkey. At present there is also
considerable return migration from Germany to Turkey, so the net
flows are much smaller, but the key fact remains that even with the
present restrictions migration cannot be stopped.
How would the situation change if Turkey were eventually to
join? And, is there any reason to impose even stricter conditions
on Turkey than were imposed on the recent new member states in
terms of labour mobility? The incumbent EU-15 member states gave
themselves the possibility to keep their labour markets closed to
workers from the new member states for potentially up to 7 years
after accession (2 plus 3 plus 2). If Turkey accedes by, say, 2015,
the full mobility of workers might thus come only after the year
2020 (in 17 years or even later).
What is the likelihood that the EU would experience mass
migration from Turkey after the year 2020? This is of course
difficult to predict, but one key point is clear: if Turkey
formally becomes a prospective EU member, the convergence process
should accelerate. GDP per capita in Turkey is now below 30% of the
EU average if measured at purchasing power parity. Within the next
generation, this might have risen to above 50% of the EU average,
about the level at which emigration stopped in the case of
Portugal, when it joined the EU almost a generation ago. A dynamic
Turkish economy would make it much less attractive for Turkish
workers to emigrate – and many might chose to return. This study
shows that it is possible that there would be less migration from a
rapidly growing EU member Turkey, than from a Turkey that had been
excluded from EU membership and therefore had much lower
growth.
For all these reasons, the fear that millions of Turkish workers
will flood the EU (principally German) labour markets seems vastly
exaggerated. Moreover, by the year 2020, the EU labour markets will
keenly feel the effects of the progressive ageing of the population
(not only among the EU-15, but also among the new member states)
and may thus actually be experiencing labour shortages, instead of
the widespread unemployment that is still the rule today.
To read the full text of the article, visit the CEPS website.