Le 22 novembre 2004, les ministres de la défense de
l’Union ont donné leur feu vert à la création de 13
« groupes de combat » européens. Ces unités combattantes
mobiles devront pouvoir être déployées en quelques
jours en cas de situation de crise. Cette initiative vise
à conférer à l’UE une capacité d’action militaire dans
des régions éloignées du théâtre européen, et plus largement
à donner davantage de « muscle » à la Politique européenne
de sécurité et de défense (PESD). Cette analyse de la Fondation Konrad Adenauer étudie les
problèmes potentiels que risquent de rencontrer les Etats membres
au moment de la mise en place de ces unités, et s’interroge sur le
réalisme du calendrier prévu.
At first, the idea of small, highly mobile, combat units with the
ability to react to European crises – initially termed “Tactical
Groups” – was launched at the British-French summit in Le Tourquet
on 4 February 2003. In light of the growing problems of failing
states in Africa, it seemed sensible to be able to rapidly employ
military force mandated by the United Nations. Nine months later,
the concept was put into concrete terms by the two countries at a
further summit meeting in London. The past experiences of the
EU-Operation “Artemis” in the Congo during the summer ofthat year
had been taken into consideration and had led to the planning of
rapidly deployable units with a strength of approximately 1,500
soldiers. These units were to be able to intervene in conflicts far
outside of Europe, with their main focus being Africa (but also
elsewhere), and to stabilize the situation until sufficient
military forces – UN peacekeeping troops or armed forces from other
organizations – were on hand to settle it. Early February 2004, the
German Defense Minister Struck expressed interest in Battle Groups
during informal talks at the Security Conference in Munich,
where-by the project was transformed into a trilateral initiative.
A food-for-thought paper formulated the details and was submitted
to the Political and Security Policy Committee of the EU (PSC).
Whereas Battle Groups were initially envisaged only as national
units, this incentive paper stressed a multinational character.
According to it, Battle Groups could either be formed from one
country alone or be multinational. A EU-member could also serve as
a “framework nation”, i.e. as the main component of a Battle Group,
while smaller countries would contribute their respective niche
capacities. The main criterion for a particular configuration would
be the military efficiency of the combat unit. At the informal
meeting of the EU defense ministers in April 2004, the concept
found broad consensus and was resolved on 16 June 2004 by the
European Council. In November 2004, the defense ministers agreed
upon the details of the project. Thus, 13 Battle Groups are
planned, each with a force of at least 1,500 soldiers. A core of
three to four light combat regiments is to be reinforced by
command- and combat support units. Sapper-, antiaircraft-, signal-,
or logistical forces are „Analysen und Argumente“ of the Konrad
Adenauer Foundation 15/2004 ? page 3 correspondingly assigned
according to the contingency – similarly, if required, NBCdefense,
military police as well as air- and naval forces. Battle Groups are
to be ready for deployment in 5 to 10 days (after a maximal 5-day
decision-making process in the EU). By 2005, a so-called “Initial
Operational Capability” is to be created, which, for instance, is
to be able to carry out small evacuation procedures. The “Full
Operational Capability” is to be reached pursuant to planning by
2007 and the EU is to be in the position to deploy two of these
Battle Groups simultaneously in an ambit of 6,000 kilometers
(extending out from Brussels). Each Battle Group is to be able to
remain deployed for 30 days, and, through reinforcements and troop
substitutions, this period could be extended to 120 days. So far,
confirmed commitments for a total of 12 Battle Groups are in
existence. Four of them are designated as purely national (France,
Great Britain, Spain and Italy) and are thereby politically easier
to use in risky operations. The remainder are multinational or are
assembled according to the framework model. Germany has thus far
agreed to three Battle Groups: ?? A German-French Battle Group with
Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain also contributing. By 2006, this
alliance is to have already achieved partial operational capability
for evacuation and extraction. ?? A German-Dutch led taskforce,
with cooperation by the Finnish, is to reach its fulloperational
capability by the first half of 2007. ?? The third group will
consist of Germany, Poland and Slovakia with Latvia and Lithuania
also participating. This group is to be functional by 2009, 2010 at
the latest. On 18 November 2004, Austria expressed the wish to
establish a further Battle Group with Germany and the Czech
Republic. For this fourth unit with German involvement, however,
there is still no set time frame, above all because this question
is disputed in Austrian domestic politics. Germany strongly
emphasizes to consider the Battle Group concept only in connection
with the also projected NATO Response Force (NRF). The EU project
is not to constrain the establishment of the NATO force – precisely
because an increase in the defense budgets is not anticipated in
the foreseeable future. Thus, the NRF, at least from the German
perspective, takes priority. The problem of competition between
NATO and the EU appears, however, not only in the construction
phase, but also in later implementation. Since both rapid reaction
forces can only be formed from existing military capabilities (the
so-called “single set forces”), more specific rules for the access
rights of both organizations are required. „Analysen und Argumente“
of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation 15/2004 ? page 4 Yet, the
tension-filled relationship between NATO and the EU, in which
particularly France often creates frictions, makes an agreement on
such regulations difficult. 2. Chances of Realization The idea of
small EU-combat troops, especially for missions on behalf of the
United Nations, makes sense. Also, the EU’s emphasis on failing
states in Africa is understandable, as NATO has another
geographical perspective with regards to its response force. Yet,
the Battle Group concept raises multiple, particularly military
questions, as to, for instance, the degree of multi-nationality or
the inter-operational capabilities of the armed forces. The core
problem, however, is whether the EU will find the strength to
implement the agreed-upon concept in times of limited financial
resources at all. Regarding its claims to deploy Battle Groups far
beyond its own borders, the EU presently lacks the requirements for
achieving such a goal. For instance, according tot he
food-for-thought paper, air transportation for the initial
deployment of a single Battle Group requires approximately 200
flights by C-130 transport airplanes (or 30 flights of the C-17
Globemaster Transporter, of which Great Britain is the only
EU-member to own, with four total and a fifth ordered). The lack of
a EU strategic deployment capability, i.e. the possibility to
transport large amounts of military equipment over vast distances,
is often euphemistically called “bottleneck resource” – to paper
over that it is just not available. The circumscription holds also
true for military intelligence and secure communication – they are
hardly available as well. Indeed, the EU has already agreed
multiple times to remedy blatant deficiencies regarding the
deployment of armed forces (strategic transport, logistics,
communications). In most cases, however, the necessary means have
been provided only rudimentary. In December 1999, the EU agreed
upon the so-called “Headline Goal”. It stipulated that, by the end
of 2003, a rapid response force composed of 60,000 soldiers was to
be kept ready. It should be deployable within 60 days and be
sustainable for up to a year. One year later, the EU members
committed up to 100,000 men, 400 aircraft and 100 ships to equip
the projected force. Although most commitments were recognizable as
pro forma from the beginning, the Headline Goal was soon
declared„Analysen und Argumente“ of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation
15/2004 ? page 5 as « initially operational capable ». In 2003, the
EU asserted that it had achieved the Headline Goal, declaring the
full operational capability of the rapid reaction force. Alas, the
intended crisis management capability of 60 000 men was a
Potemkin’s Village. In half recognition of the failure, in June
2004 a new goal was set – this time named « Headline Goal 2010 »,
including the Battle Groups as a one component. It is not to be
excluded in view of scarce means that the EU will again follow the
same pattern: declare intermediate objectives as reached, although
the necessary « hardware » only exists on paper. In that case, in a
few years from now the full operational capability of the Battle
Groups would be celebrated, even though the rapid reaction force
would only consist of virtual units. Even if budget priorities
could be changed for the benefit of military programs, the question
of political consensus within the EU on military action still
emerges. For what or against what should the forthcoming forces be
used? Vague declarations of intent to carry out missions in failing
states do not necessarily guarantee an agreement on in which state
the EU will act and with which political goal. So far, neither the
EU nor other security organizations, as witnessed during the recent
humanitarian catastrophes in Africa, have an impressing record in
timely and decisive political or military action for humanitarian
purposes. The fact that NATO has the same problem of becoming more
militarily efficient, but finding ever less consensus politically
on the use of this efficiency, does not make the situation easier.
It holds true for the Battle Groups – as for many of the intentions
in the ESVP framework: it is a useful concept, which still raises
skepticism since the questions of implementation and financing are
not answered accordingly